The Story of Charlie Company
From the Halls of Pendleton...
1st Corps Medium Tank Battalion was the first battalion of the Marine Corps to use the Medium tanks, and was activated on 18 January, 1943 at Camp Eliot (California). These tanks were newly developed M4A2 medium tanks, the best the United States possessed.
1st Corps Medium Tank Battalion was the first battalion of the Marine Corps to use the Medium tanks, and was activated on 18 January, 1943 at Camp Eliot (California). These tanks were newly developed M4A2 medium tanks, the best the United States possessed.
A few Chrysler M4A4s were used by the 1st Corps Medium Tank Battalion before the new M4A2s were shipped. This one is operated by some Charlie Company men in the vast Pendleton's openfields. Photo: Nevala
Company C of this Battalion, led by 1st Lieutenant Edward Bale since May 1943 was the only medium tank company to take part in the invasion of Tarawa.
Members of the company trained at Jacques Farm (now part of Camp Pendleton, near San Diego, California). The men who joined this battalion had only been enlisted for a few months (for most of them). Battalion drills consisted of “basic and advanced” tank training.
As noted by Ed Bale more than 60 years after the events, “There was no liaison, no training with the infantry, [and] no training with the artillery or anything”. [1]
The radios, an important component of the tanks' equipment, were not reliable. Tanks from C Company, like all the first USMC tanks, were equipped with the RU-GF or so-called “Ruji-Fuji” radios, an obsolescent aircraft radio system.
They were not compatible with the infantry’s TBX and TBY radios. Moreover, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the company was able to talk to all his platoon leaders, but the platoon leaders could not talk back to the CO. In the same way, the platoon leaders could talk to their individual tanks, but the subordinate tanks couldn’t talk back to their platoon leaders.
The problem had not been noted during training but, on Tarawa, the radios were revealed to be completely unsuited for both tanks-infantry cooperation and tank-to-tank communications.
Another major problem with the bulky RU-GF radio was that it was mounted in the turret bustle, and the loader was also the radio operator. In combat the loader is the busiest man in the tank, loading the 75mm and .30caliber coaxial guns, discarding empty shell casings, clearing jams in the .30caliber, and constantly rearranging stowage of the 75mm ammunition, as well as maintaining the cranky radio. Both the tank commander and radio operator could talk over the radio. Bill Eads was the loader/radio operator in Cobra, the command tank for 2nd Platoon. He remembered that “most of the time I was busy…loading, loading the 75millimeter” and that not much talking went on.
Members of the company trained at Jacques Farm (now part of Camp Pendleton, near San Diego, California). The men who joined this battalion had only been enlisted for a few months (for most of them). Battalion drills consisted of “basic and advanced” tank training.
As noted by Ed Bale more than 60 years after the events, “There was no liaison, no training with the infantry, [and] no training with the artillery or anything”. [1]
The radios, an important component of the tanks' equipment, were not reliable. Tanks from C Company, like all the first USMC tanks, were equipped with the RU-GF or so-called “Ruji-Fuji” radios, an obsolescent aircraft radio system.
They were not compatible with the infantry’s TBX and TBY radios. Moreover, the Commanding Officer (CO) of the company was able to talk to all his platoon leaders, but the platoon leaders could not talk back to the CO. In the same way, the platoon leaders could talk to their individual tanks, but the subordinate tanks couldn’t talk back to their platoon leaders.
The problem had not been noted during training but, on Tarawa, the radios were revealed to be completely unsuited for both tanks-infantry cooperation and tank-to-tank communications.
Another major problem with the bulky RU-GF radio was that it was mounted in the turret bustle, and the loader was also the radio operator. In combat the loader is the busiest man in the tank, loading the 75mm and .30caliber coaxial guns, discarding empty shell casings, clearing jams in the .30caliber, and constantly rearranging stowage of the 75mm ammunition, as well as maintaining the cranky radio. Both the tank commander and radio operator could talk over the radio. Bill Eads was the loader/radio operator in Cobra, the command tank for 2nd Platoon. He remembered that “most of the time I was busy…loading, loading the 75millimeter” and that not much talking went on.
C Co. tents at Pendleton. Photo: Joe Woolum
During training, all the men of the company were trained on tanks, and at different positions within them (gunner, driver, etc.). In July 1943 when they shipped out of San Diego, they left their ‘training tanks’ at Pendleton and took new tanks with them.
All tanks were originally made under US Army contracts, but because of Army policy not to use diesel-powered tanks, the M4A2s were delivered to the Marine Corps. All were procured from the Detroit area (Michigan) by the battalion commander and the battalion maintenance officer, just before they sailed out of San Diego. In most cases, tanks were repainted by the Marines, but on some of the new vehicles the Army star painted on the turret flanks and the original Army numbers were still visible on the hulls.
A total of fourteen tanks, one VTR (Vehicle Tank Recovery, the first such vehicle that the USMC had) and all the C Company men embarked on a Liberty ship for New Caledonia.
By this time, “New Caledonia was almost sinking with US personnel and equipment” remembers Ed Bale. Charlie Company was located close to Noumea. “Unfortunately, there was no training area on the whole island, so we parked the tanks in a tank park and did nothing but maintenance and took hikes and this kind of thing for about two months” remembered Ed Bale.
During the whole period spent in New Caledonia, the crews never trained or even practice fired with their tank armament.
After a couple of months, Ed Bale received written orders to leave New Caledonia. He, his men and their tanks embarked aboard the USS Mormacport on 27 September 1943 to join the 2nd Marine Division, in New Zealand.
They arrived on 14 October; instead of unloading, Bale was told to unload only two tanks with twelve men for an exercise. The Division officers “wanted to do some experimental work on a 40 watt radio” said Bale, with an infantry battalion from the 2nd Marine Division, at a place called Hawke’s Bay. [1]
During the exercise, the rest of the company stayed in New Zealand about a week and went back to New Caledonia. In fact, “there was not time enough for it [USS Ashland] to come to New Zealand and load us out and get back north in time for the operation” noted Ed Bale (Gilbert, p. 82).
A few days after returning to New Caledonia, on 3 November 1943, the men from C Company were picked up by the USS Ashland “for duty with 2nd Tank Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, in the Field”.
Charlie Company was “loaned” to the 2nd Marine Division, under the orders of the Commanding Officer in charge of the 2nd Tank Battalion; Lt. Colonel Alexander Swenceski.
The Ashland sailed to the French New Hebrides, where most of Naval Task Force 53 was stationed, and made port at Havana Harbor, Efate island on 6 November.
The group that trained at Hawke's Bay sailed on the USS Doyen from Wellington (New Zealand) on 1 November, and joined at Efate island, where they disembarked on 7 November and re-embarked aboard the Ashland the same day.
The Ashland sailed from New Hebrides on 13 November with 151 men of C Company and their fourteen medium tanks for the Tarawa operation.
Because of the lack of space on the USS Ashland, the VTR couldn't be loaded with the rest of the vehicles and stayed in New Caledonia.
USS Ashland arrived off Tarawa on 19 November.
… to the Shores of Tarawa…
To reduce the difficulty of disembarking loaded landing craft from the Ashland, it had to proceed close to the reef to minimizing rolling and pitching of the ship. Before the sun rose, between 0506 and 0525 hours on the morning of D-day, 20 November, LCM-3s (Landing Craft designed to carry tanks or heavy material) with the medium tanks aboard were disembarked from the LSD off Betio. At 0615, the LCPR (Landing Craft Personnel, Ramp, similar but smaller than an LCVP, designed to carry troops) of the reconnaissance platoon left the LSD.
The plan of battle was to unload the four platoons on two beaches. The HQ Section and 1st Platoon were to land on Red Beach 1, and the 2nd and 3rd Platoon on Red Beach 3.
(Some accounts state that the 2nd and 3rd Platoon were to land on Red 2 and Red 3
respectively). At this month of the year, tides were relatively low according to Major Frank Holland, a New Zealand naval reserve officer who was familiar with the atoll before the Japanese occupation. There might also be a “dodging tide”, an even lower tide; Tarawa is one of the few places on earth where this phenomenon occurs. “There won’t be three feet of water on the reef!” he stated. Shallow water would have been perfect for the tanks which couldn’t ford water over 40 inches deep (about one meter). However, if the water exceeded 40 inches on Red 1, the plan was to land all the tanks on Red 3.
Note that if the low tides prevented the landing boats from reaching the beach of Betio and grounded them on the reef, (about 500 yards from the beach), the men would have to walk this distance, through deep water, and under Japanese fire.
Lieutenant Colonel David M. Shoup (General Smith's operation officer, who would later command troops on Tarawa) proposed that LVTs (Landing Vehicles, Tracked, floating tractors equipped with caterpillars treads, and able to cross the reef), carry the first waves of Marines to the beach.
The fourteen tanks of C Company, in fourteen LCM-3’s, were scheduled to land with the fifth wave (some sources say the fourth wave), at H-Hour + 20.
Six minutes before (H+14), the “reconnaissance party” consisting of twenty two men, was to disembark from the LCPR on Red 1 to mark a safe passage for the tanks. For this purpose, each man had “three floats with about a six-foot cord and an anchor”, remembered Melvin Swango (Gilbert, p.88).
After having marked the channel, the remainder of the section was to proceed to Red Beach 3 and mark a safe passage to that beach.
They had just six minutes to mark channels on Red Beach 1 under the enemy fire, move east to Red 3 under heavy fire and mark channels on that beach too.
Of course, nothing happened according to the plan.
H Hour was planned for 0900 hours but was delayed because of miscommunications. Due to the chaos, waves three and four of Marines needed a lot of time to land: landing craft couldn’t cross the reef, so the Marines had to wait for the surviving LVTs to come back from the beach, load them, and to finish unloading them on the beach. After each wave, fewer LVTs returned, having been knocked out of action, so many Marines sections decided to cross the reef by walking through the deep water.
When the recon section’s boat hit the reef, machine gun fire was intense and that hell swept the Higgins boat and “maybe five or six men felt on the deck […] either killed or wounded”, remembered Swango (Gilbert, p.88).
However, the survivors started to mark the channel on Red 1 and found that the lines for the floats tangled in the salt water. They couldn’t do anything with them.
They decided to leave a man in front of each bomb crater to direct the tanks around each crater they found on the reef. It was probably the longest six minutes of their lives for the scouts. Machine gun fire continued to hit the water and men's bodies. With each minute that passed, fewer men stood in the water.
From this section, only a few men survived, stated Melvin Swango: “I only know of three of us that survived. There was myself, Charlie Kaiser, and another man…” (Gilbert, p.88).
A few minutes later, the LCMs carrying the tanks approached the reef.
When Ed Bale’s LCM grounded on the reef offshore of Red Beach 1, he measured the depth of the water, which was about 30 inches at that point. That depth could be carrefully and slowly forded by the tanks which were not equipped with any fording kits.
Bale decided to land his tanks.
Tanks from the 1st Platoon and HQ section splashed into the water at about 1000 hours (sixteen minutes after the men of the third wave hit the beach – Gilbert). When they landed on the reef, 1000 yards (914 meters) short of the beach, they found that the marker buoys were floating away.
Machine gun fire continued to sweep the Marines, who were trying to find cover. Tanks were also targeted by heavy enemy fire, but that threat was not important, as it was mostly automatic weapons remembered Bale. A greater threat was the depth of water. “The water got up to well over five feet deep”, said Bale. [1]
The tanks’ Technical Manual listed a maximum fording depth of 40 inches, at lowest speed. (page 17 of the manual).
The problem was that the main electrical junction box (see illustration below) was placed at the bottom of the turret basket, and was vulnerable to the water. As Gilbert explains in his book, “without electrical power the crews could no longer operate the main gun, and […] the tanks quickly flooded”. (page 89)
The electrical junction box (cover removed)
Source: Technical Manual M4A2, p 353, January 1943.
Of the six tanks that landed on Red Beach1, one tank ran into a bomb crater on the reef.
Between three and five tanks (depending on the source) reached the beach. The others had their electrical system disabled by the water or fell into bomb craters while approaching the beach.
When he got ashore, Ed Bale tried to find a way to go through the sea wall (4-1/2 to 5 feet high in places) and make contact with the 1st Platoon tanks. The original plan was that an engineer section with demolition equipment was to open a breach in the seawall. “I haven’t seen any engineer to this day”, stated Bale. [1]
Due to the radio problems, Bale sent one of the survivors from the recon guide section “to locate the 1st Platoon Leader (Lt. William Sheedy) and have him bring tanks to my location”. (Ed Bale interview, Gilbert p.90). After the battle, both men were found, side by side, dead on the beach.
As mentioned in the After Action Report, “it was impossible for the tanks to stay on a dry beach” due to the congestion of personnel and damaged LVT's piled along the coconut logs wall.
Bale decided to re-enter the water with his tanks and run parallel to the beach in a westerly direction to try and find a gap in the wall. While maneuvering in the water between one and three tanks were lost to flooding.
In color film footage, you can clearly see two tanks, and perhaps a third one, close to each other, a few meters from the beach, sunk in the water off Red 1.
Of the six tanks which landed on Red 1, only two survived Cecilia and China Gal. The crew members that tanks that had been disabled, attached themselves to the infantry on Red 1.
About 50 yards from the boundary between Red Beach 1 and Green Beach, on the “bird’s beak”, the two surviving tanks finally found a hole through the seawall. Ed Bale: “Fortunately, we came across a place where it looked like maybe the Japanese had a break in the seawall to run trucks and all out of that reef when it was dry, or low tide and we got through that”. [1]
It was about 1130 hours when the two tanks got onto dry land.
The two tanks started inland, Bale’s tank to the right of the other, to find surviving Marines. Progress was slow due to the smoke and dust. “Two of my men volunteered to get out and lead us on foot, spotting the targets for us” Ed Bale said to the Marine Corps correspondent, Sgt. Samuel Shaffer, shortly after hostilities had ceased. But “both of them were killed” concluded Bale.
“We didn’t see any Marines. We saw a lot of Japanese running, and we started shooting at them with the machine guns.” (Bale interview, Gilbert, p.90).
Soon afterward, a Japanese light tank, a Type 95 Ha-Go, appeared from behind a embankment. Cecilia engaged the tank, but a round fired by the Japanese light tank's 37mm gun knocked out Cecilia's main gun and it's turret traverse mechanism. Quickly, the other M4, China Gal, destroyed the Japanese tank.
The round that damaged Cecilia's main gun was an unbelievably lucky shot, and it went right up the barrel of Cecilia's 75mm gun. Bale later said that it lit up the inside of his tank "like a Christmas tree".
Bale decided to fall back on Red 1 to evaluate the damage to his tank's main gun while China Gal continued the fight alone.
While on the beach, Bale realized that it was too risky to try to fire on anything with the damaged 75mm gun. He decided to use his tank as a mobile machine gun and went back to join China Gal. Bale switched tanks, and took control of China Gal. Both tanks linked up with the infantry of 3/2 (3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines) at about 1400 hours. There, Bale met Major Michael Ryan, who took over the battalion command on Red 1. “We designed, in about 60 seconds, the tank infantry tactics the Marine Corps would use the rest of World War II.” Bale remembered later. [1]
The two tanks started slowly working at eliminating pillboxes and blowing out strong enemy pockets. “Infantry units followed closely and worked forward (about 50 yards behind tanks, the action report points out)."
“We worked until late afternoon on D-Day” remembered Bale. At about 1800 hours, infantry started to dig in for the night. "Mike cornered me and said, ‘I’m going to try to pull all these bits and pieces of troops we have together and pull them back for the night’. So I took the two tanks and went back almost to the beach”. [1]Bale and Ryan returned to the beach and rounded up every Marine able to carry a rifle to defend the beachhead.
There, Ed Bale and his men moved the remaining 75 mm ammunition out of Cecilia, which could not use her main gun anymore, into China Gal. That night, Cecilia was used for flank protection on Red 1.
The Americans expected a counterattack from the Japanese, which never came. Indeed, the Japanese were completely disorganized. The only threat that night was from the mortars which kept firing rounds on the beach. Ed Bale: “After dark […] I dug in alongside an amtrac that had been knocked out. Sometime during the night the Japanese dropped a mortar round in it and I got up and moved.” He continued: “I ran down and found an empty hole, went down in it and lay there and shook like a leaf, but some of my men had taken some machine guns out of those disabled tanks in the water and put them on ground mounts, and put them down on the left flank in case we got attacked from there.” [1]
At the end of D-Day, on Red 1, of the six tanks that landed, four ran into shell holes along the beach or shorted out their electrical system wet.
One tank, Cecilia, lost its main gun in a fight with a Japanese tank and had its traverse mechanism knocked out too. This tank continued the fight with its machineguns and hauled ammunition and water to the troops.
China Gal, was the only one left in fully operable condition.
The eight tanks of the two other Platoons landed on Red 3, about five hundred yards from the beach. Tanks from both platoons landed between the main pier and Burn’s Philp pier.
Since the recon guides never reached Red 3, the infantry probably served as guides for the tanks.
Only one tank of the 2nd Platoon fell into a shell hole, at few meters from the beach. The three surviving tanks of the 2nd Platoon proceeded to a previously designated assembly area on Red Beach 2 and linked up with Colonel Shoup’s infantry.
At about 1130 hours they moved west, on the right flank of LT 2/2. While the platoon leader's tank, Cobra, was waved back by infantry in this area, the other two tanks were attached to an infantry unit of LT 1/2 and helped them to cross the airfield’s west taxi strip at about 1300. All three tanks started to shell enemy strong points and positions along the front.
Within a few minutes, one of the two mediums that helped infantry to cross the runway was out of action. It “was hit by a hail of gunfire. As it maneuvered to escape, it tumbled into a crater and had to be abandoned” (Gilbert, p92). This tank was later pulled out at dawn of the next morning.
The other tank continued the fight alone and was put out of action when a “Japanese sailor ran out and slapped a magnetic mine against the sponson” (Gilbert, p92).
On the other side, the platoon leader's tank, Cobra, went on alone across the island, and pushed forward until reaching the southern edge of the airfield, where it spent the night.
Despite the fact that there were no recon guides in place, the four tanks of the 3rd Platoon gained the beach without loss.
These tanks moved the reef under Japanese fire and one tank, the platoon leader tank, Cannonball, “took a heavy calibre hit on the slope plate that sheared away the sponson antenna and wrecked the command net radio”. (Gilbert, p.92).
When they hit the beach, the 3rd Platoon immediately proceeded inland. Tanks went on without infantry support across the front-line, which proved to be a mistake.
During the first hour’s operation, one medium was abandoned when a 75 mm antiaircraft gun targeted it in the central triangle of the airfield.
The Japanese did not have large antitank guns on Tarawa. The 75mm Type 88 antiaircraft guns like these preserved at the Nimitz Museum (National Museum of the Pacific War) were large-caliber AA guns pressed into service as AT guns, much like the more famous German 88s.
Between three and five tanks (depending on the source) reached the beach. The others had their electrical system disabled by the water or fell into bomb craters while approaching the beach.
When he got ashore, Ed Bale tried to find a way to go through the sea wall (4-1/2 to 5 feet high in places) and make contact with the 1st Platoon tanks. The original plan was that an engineer section with demolition equipment was to open a breach in the seawall. “I haven’t seen any engineer to this day”, stated Bale. [1]
Due to the radio problems, Bale sent one of the survivors from the recon guide section “to locate the 1st Platoon Leader (Lt. William Sheedy) and have him bring tanks to my location”. (Ed Bale interview, Gilbert p.90). After the battle, both men were found, side by side, dead on the beach.
As mentioned in the After Action Report, “it was impossible for the tanks to stay on a dry beach” due to the congestion of personnel and damaged LVT's piled along the coconut logs wall.
Bale decided to re-enter the water with his tanks and run parallel to the beach in a westerly direction to try and find a gap in the wall. While maneuvering in the water between one and three tanks were lost to flooding.
In color film footage, you can clearly see two tanks, and perhaps a third one, close to each other, a few meters from the beach, sunk in the water off Red 1.
Of the six tanks which landed on Red 1, only two survived Cecilia and China Gal. The crew members that tanks that had been disabled, attached themselves to the infantry on Red 1.
About 50 yards from the boundary between Red Beach 1 and Green Beach, on the “bird’s beak”, the two surviving tanks finally found a hole through the seawall. Ed Bale: “Fortunately, we came across a place where it looked like maybe the Japanese had a break in the seawall to run trucks and all out of that reef when it was dry, or low tide and we got through that”. [1]
It was about 1130 hours when the two tanks got onto dry land.
The two tanks started inland, Bale’s tank to the right of the other, to find surviving Marines. Progress was slow due to the smoke and dust. “Two of my men volunteered to get out and lead us on foot, spotting the targets for us” Ed Bale said to the Marine Corps correspondent, Sgt. Samuel Shaffer, shortly after hostilities had ceased. But “both of them were killed” concluded Bale.
“We didn’t see any Marines. We saw a lot of Japanese running, and we started shooting at them with the machine guns.” (Bale interview, Gilbert, p.90).
Soon afterward, a Japanese light tank, a Type 95 Ha-Go, appeared from behind a embankment. Cecilia engaged the tank, but a round fired by the Japanese light tank's 37mm gun knocked out Cecilia's main gun and it's turret traverse mechanism. Quickly, the other M4, China Gal, destroyed the Japanese tank.
The round that damaged Cecilia's main gun was an unbelievably lucky shot, and it went right up the barrel of Cecilia's 75mm gun. Bale later said that it lit up the inside of his tank "like a Christmas tree".
Bale decided to fall back on Red 1 to evaluate the damage to his tank's main gun while China Gal continued the fight alone.
While on the beach, Bale realized that it was too risky to try to fire on anything with the damaged 75mm gun. He decided to use his tank as a mobile machine gun and went back to join China Gal. Bale switched tanks, and took control of China Gal. Both tanks linked up with the infantry of 3/2 (3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines) at about 1400 hours. There, Bale met Major Michael Ryan, who took over the battalion command on Red 1. “We designed, in about 60 seconds, the tank infantry tactics the Marine Corps would use the rest of World War II.” Bale remembered later. [1]
The two tanks started slowly working at eliminating pillboxes and blowing out strong enemy pockets. “Infantry units followed closely and worked forward (about 50 yards behind tanks, the action report points out)."
“We worked until late afternoon on D-Day” remembered Bale. At about 1800 hours, infantry started to dig in for the night. "Mike cornered me and said, ‘I’m going to try to pull all these bits and pieces of troops we have together and pull them back for the night’. So I took the two tanks and went back almost to the beach”. [1]Bale and Ryan returned to the beach and rounded up every Marine able to carry a rifle to defend the beachhead.
There, Ed Bale and his men moved the remaining 75 mm ammunition out of Cecilia, which could not use her main gun anymore, into China Gal. That night, Cecilia was used for flank protection on Red 1.
The Americans expected a counterattack from the Japanese, which never came. Indeed, the Japanese were completely disorganized. The only threat that night was from the mortars which kept firing rounds on the beach. Ed Bale: “After dark […] I dug in alongside an amtrac that had been knocked out. Sometime during the night the Japanese dropped a mortar round in it and I got up and moved.” He continued: “I ran down and found an empty hole, went down in it and lay there and shook like a leaf, but some of my men had taken some machine guns out of those disabled tanks in the water and put them on ground mounts, and put them down on the left flank in case we got attacked from there.” [1]
At the end of D-Day, on Red 1, of the six tanks that landed, four ran into shell holes along the beach or shorted out their electrical system wet.
One tank, Cecilia, lost its main gun in a fight with a Japanese tank and had its traverse mechanism knocked out too. This tank continued the fight with its machineguns and hauled ammunition and water to the troops.
China Gal, was the only one left in fully operable condition.
The eight tanks of the two other Platoons landed on Red 3, about five hundred yards from the beach. Tanks from both platoons landed between the main pier and Burn’s Philp pier.
Since the recon guides never reached Red 3, the infantry probably served as guides for the tanks.
Only one tank of the 2nd Platoon fell into a shell hole, at few meters from the beach. The three surviving tanks of the 2nd Platoon proceeded to a previously designated assembly area on Red Beach 2 and linked up with Colonel Shoup’s infantry.
At about 1130 hours they moved west, on the right flank of LT 2/2. While the platoon leader's tank, Cobra, was waved back by infantry in this area, the other two tanks were attached to an infantry unit of LT 1/2 and helped them to cross the airfield’s west taxi strip at about 1300. All three tanks started to shell enemy strong points and positions along the front.
Within a few minutes, one of the two mediums that helped infantry to cross the runway was out of action. It “was hit by a hail of gunfire. As it maneuvered to escape, it tumbled into a crater and had to be abandoned” (Gilbert, p92). This tank was later pulled out at dawn of the next morning.
The other tank continued the fight alone and was put out of action when a “Japanese sailor ran out and slapped a magnetic mine against the sponson” (Gilbert, p92).
On the other side, the platoon leader's tank, Cobra, went on alone across the island, and pushed forward until reaching the southern edge of the airfield, where it spent the night.
Despite the fact that there were no recon guides in place, the four tanks of the 3rd Platoon gained the beach without loss.
These tanks moved the reef under Japanese fire and one tank, the platoon leader tank, Cannonball, “took a heavy calibre hit on the slope plate that sheared away the sponson antenna and wrecked the command net radio”. (Gilbert, p.92).
When they hit the beach, the 3rd Platoon immediately proceeded inland. Tanks went on without infantry support across the front-line, which proved to be a mistake.
During the first hour’s operation, one medium was abandoned when a 75 mm antiaircraft gun targeted it in the central triangle of the airfield.
The Japanese did not have large antitank guns on Tarawa. The 75mm Type 88 antiaircraft guns like these preserved at the Nimitz Museum (National Museum of the Pacific War) were large-caliber AA guns pressed into service as AT guns, much like the more famous German 88s.
Thanks to Reagan Grau from the National Museum of the Pacific War (Fredericksburg, TX) for allowing us to use pictures from their displayed weapons.
This same weapon caused the loss of two other tanks: the platoon leader's tank tried to avoid the rounds fired by the Japanese gun and fell into a fuel pit filled with barrels of aviation fuel. After the crew escaped the trapped tank, the pit, for whatever reason caught fire. Due to the high temperatures of the fuel fire, the tank’s main gun propellant exploded and tore the right sponson plate off the tank.
Another tank was also knocked out by this 75 mm gun. The armor of the left sponson prevented the first 75mm shell from penetrating the tank, but, the second round was fatal for the now exposed tank.
The fourth tank of this platoon, Colorado, accomplished its mission; it crossed the island in the center, and returned to the northern beach.
By the end of the D-Day, at 1800 hours, the following tanks remained in action:
Cecilia and China Gal on Red Beach 1. Cecilia lost its main gun in a tank versus tank fight, and China Gal was left in fully operational conditions.
On Red Beach 2 Cobra spent the night on the southern tip of the airfield, and another was temporarily disabled in a shell hole but was recovered the next morning.
On Red Beach 3, Colorado was hit several times during its attack across the island but remained operational.
Another tank was also knocked out by this 75 mm gun. The armor of the left sponson prevented the first 75mm shell from penetrating the tank, but, the second round was fatal for the now exposed tank.
The fourth tank of this platoon, Colorado, accomplished its mission; it crossed the island in the center, and returned to the northern beach.
By the end of the D-Day, at 1800 hours, the following tanks remained in action:
Cecilia and China Gal on Red Beach 1. Cecilia lost its main gun in a tank versus tank fight, and China Gal was left in fully operational conditions.
On Red Beach 2 Cobra spent the night on the southern tip of the airfield, and another was temporarily disabled in a shell hole but was recovered the next morning.
On Red Beach 3, Colorado was hit several times during its attack across the island but remained operational.
Source: Archives and Special Collections; Library of the Marine Corps.
By the end of the day, Marines held only a thin beachhead which they reinforced during the night in case of a Japanese counterattack. The Marines were poorly organized, and such a “Banzaï charge”, expected by most of the commanders, could have annihilated the survivors of that first day's action. Smith and Hill send a message to the commanders of the operation, Turner, Sruance, and Nimitz: “Issue remains in doubt”.
The counterattack never came. “The Japanese were as badly disorganized as we were” remembered Bale (Gilbert, p.93). Historian Colonel Joseph Alexander theorized that Admiral Shibazaki had been killed by the preliminary bombardment of the island. In the chaos of the situation, and with their telephone communications lines cut by the shelling, the Japanese were left without effective command and control.
The counterattack never came. “The Japanese were as badly disorganized as we were” remembered Bale (Gilbert, p.93). Historian Colonel Joseph Alexander theorized that Admiral Shibazaki had been killed by the preliminary bombardment of the island. In the chaos of the situation, and with their telephone communications lines cut by the shelling, the Japanese were left without effective command and control.
By the morning of D+1, on 21 November, 1st Lt. Bale picked up China Gal when Ryan met him and told him “there’s the left flank taking a lot of fire from the Japanese emplacements in that cove”. [1] Mike Ryan was talking about "The Pocket", the enemy fortified area at the boundary of Red 1 and 2 that had caused so many casualties among the Marines who had landed the previous morning.
Also, beginning at 0615 hours, men of the 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, landed on the reef off Red 2, were taking heavy fire from the Japanese emplacements of that strong point.
Cecilia started to “move up and down the beach and in the water” [1] firing machine guns into the Japanese positions.
This tank eventually ran into an underwater shell hole and shorted out the electrical system. The tank had to be deserted, as noted by Gilbert in his book p.94: “With the tank canted sideways, the crew could not even manually traverse the turret to bring its gun to bear, and it was abandoned”.
Bale decided to put some of his men on the top of the disabled tanks in the water to fire the turret-mounted .50 caliber machine guns into the Japanese automatic weapons emplacements.
China Gal was assigned another mission, led by Major Mike Ryan. It was about 1120 hours when the order was given to clear a safe passage for bringing reinforcements onto the island.
China Gal, now commanded by Lt. Bale, and infantry of LT 3/2 started to move south to clear the area behind Green Beach.
Bale: “[…] we were attacking fortified positions, either from the side or the rear so that you could move that tank around with relatively impunity.” [1]
The process was slow because the infantry checked every hole and every hiding place. The tank advanced no faster than the infantry, stopping as needed to allow them to keep pace. The aim was to advance as one force: the tank fired on the strong points, and the infantry killed the Japanese in the positions, or those who attempted to charge them from the emplacements.
To destroy fortified positions like bunkers, a successful tactic was rapidly found: “[…] if you could find the opening, and fire into the opening, we could destroy them”.
Within a couple of hours and with a lot of ammunition fired, Bale’s tank and Ryan’s infantry secured a 100 yard deep position behind Green Beach. As noted by Gilbert p.95, they had “forged the single biggest contribution of the day, and perhaps of the entire battle”.
Late in the afternoon, General Julian Smith ordered in reinforcement, landing the infantry of 1/6 and light tanks on Green beach. It was these fresh troops who would eventually sweep the length of the island.
Before nightfall, Bale and his crew backed up to the beach for defensive purposes and slept under their tank. That night, a Japanese plane flew over dropping flares and some light bombs in Ryan’s perimeter. That was the only enemy move on this side of the island during the night.
By the morning of 21 November, Cobra, the command tank of the 2nd Platoon, having spent the night next to the airstrip, returned to Red 2 to unload one of its crew killed during the night.
As with Cecilia on Red 1, Cobra was told to attack enemy strong positions on the Red 1 and 2 boundary, while the 1/8 was landing just offshore.
Dead Marines who were killed the previous day were still on the beach and the tank had to approach enemy positions through the water.
While moving parallel to the beach, the unlucky tank fell into an unseen underwater crater and the crew had to abandon it.
Another tank of the 2nd Platoon was recovered during the morning and was assigned to support infantry of LT 2/2 on the right flank of Red 2. In the early afternoon, at about 1430, the tank was knocked out, hit 18 times by a Japanese anti-tank gun. However, before dying, the tank was able to destroy two five inch anti-boat guns and five pillboxes (numbers varying according the sources).
All the 2nd Platoon tanks were now out of action. On its own, the infantry of 2/2 and 1/2 crossed the airfield and hit the south beaches of Betio. This isolated contingent of about 200 men started to dig in. The infantry of 1/8 which landed during the day occupied the positions left by the 1/2 and 2/2 on the northern shore.
On Red 3, the last operational 3rd Platoon tank, Colorado, worked with Major Crowe’s infantry (2/8) to reduce a fortified Japanese pocket around the Burn’s Philp pier. This time Crowe having learned from previous mistakes, “insured that his one surviving Sherman tank was always accompanied by infantry”. (Alexander, p.29.)
Another task assigned to Colorado that day was to reduce enemy positions “that had come back to life inside the beachhead” points Gilbert, p.95. The tank worked with a bulldozer that buried the enemy positions with sand after they have been blasted by the tank. This prevented positions from being re-used by the enemy.
To move and find enemy’s positions, the tank had to be helped by the surviving infantry of C Company. Three infantrymen worked with Colorado moving bodies to open a passage for the tank while the tank protected them. These men also located targets for the tank. Doug Crotts: “Anything that we thought they [the Colorado crew] ought to see, I would lay my rifle down as if I were sighting… He [tank commander, Louis Largey] could look at my rifle, and then I would hold up fingers for how many yards out there it was”. (Gilbert, p.96).
To talk directly to the crew, Crotts used an empty 75 mm shell casing to beat on the tank. The noise attracted the attention of the men in the turret who were able to talk to the infantry through the pistol port on the rear turret side. “That was very risky, remembers Crotts. Those Japs saw you out there and they knew damn well what you were telling them”. (Gilbert, p96).
Colorado and the infantry continued to work their way throughout the perimeter the Marines had conquered the day before, clearing any remaining pockets of resistance.
Before night fell, the surviving tank fell back to the beach to spend the night and to reload with ammunition. Largey’s tank exhausted most of its ammunition and had to use 75mm pack howitzer ammunition which could be fired from the tank's gun.
At the end of D+1, 21 November, at 1800 hours, the following tanks remain in action:
One tank on Red Beach 1, China Gal, now commanded by 1st Lt Ed Bale, working with the infantry of 3/2 under Major Mike Ryan’s command.
One tank on Red Beach 3, Colorado, now commanded by 1st Lt Largey, worked with infantry of 2/8 under Major Jim Crowe’s command.
Source: Archives and Special Collections; Library of the Marine Corps.
The situation seemed much better for the Marine forces on Betio compared to the previous day, as Shoup reported it at the end of D+1: “Casualities: many. Percentage dead: unknown. Combat efficiency: we are winning. Shoup.” Beachheads were well established, and fresh and complete units had landed on Green Beach which would allow the Marines to establish their superiority on the island.
On the morning of D+2, Bale and Ryan linked up with the officer in charge of the freshly-landed troops of the 1/6, Bill Jones. At about 0800 hours, they started to move east to relieve the isolated infantry pocket of the LT 1/2 and 2/2.
At about noon, China Gal was joined by several light tanks that landed on Green Beach. Because Bale could not communicate with the light tanks, he gave instructions to the light tank commander, who knelt behind China Gal. Bale instructed him to “stay behind China Gal using his 37mm gun and his machine guns as he saw fit while being prepared to fire them to protect China Gal if the Japanese attempted to swarm her or place magnetic mines on her.” (Ed Bale)
Orders given by Jones were precise: tanks should operate less than 50 yards in front of the infantry and cover a 100 yard wide front along the southern shore.
As on the day before, the mission consisted of clearing fortified positions. To coordinate their effort, it was necessary for Bale to communicate with the infantry. To allow “safe” communications, Bale rotated the turret commander's hatch ring in such a way as to put an open hatch cover between the Japanese and him while talking to a courageous infantryman who climbed onto the turret.
Whenever the Japanese tried to exit a bunker, the infantry and the tanks machineguns started to shoot at them. Bale: “You watched out mostly for Japanese running out of bunkers and attempting to swarm up over the tanks and this kind of thing. Fortunately the infantry was good. Every time the Japanese tried that, the infantry would cut them down.”[1]
After three hours and about 250 Japanese soldiers killed, LT 1/6 and the tanks linked up with the exhausted Marines of the isolated position.
A halt was called and a medium tank that has been salvaged carried supplies to the troops suffering from a lack of water, salt pills and other supplies.
At the same time LT 3/6 commanded by McLeods landed on Green Beach and moved to LT 1/6's positions.
With Green Beach cleared, the Marines could now bring adequate ammunition, water and supplies to the troops on Betio. Unfortunately, it wasn’t foreseen to unload 75mm tank ammunition. However, 75mm pack howitzer ammunition was unloaded and it could be fired by the medium tanks' M 3 gun. “We fired a lot of 75mm pack howitzer ammunition, which didn’t seat properly, but it worked” remembers Ed Bale (Gilbert, p.102).
At about 1330 hours, LT 1/6 continued its progress toward the east but was quickly stopped by an enemy strong point. “The deadliest fire came from heavy weapons mounted in a turret-type emplacement” (Alexander, p.39).
It required 90 minutes of fierce fighting to neutralize this position. In this action, the light tanks' 37mm guns were useless against the heavily fortified position. Only the 75mm gun of China Gal was able to reduce the enemy opposition.
The progress slowed and during the rest of the afternoon China Gal cleared position after position, with the support of the light tanks and the infantry.
During this phase, China Gal destroyed some enemy fortifications such as bunkers and pillboxes. From one of those bunkers emerged around fifteen Japanese who started to attack the tanks with any kind of weapon.
One Japanese soldier threw a "land mine" on the rear deck of China Gal. But the explosive rolled back onto its owner, who was blown up by his own weapon in a blink of an eye.
By the end of the afternoon when they almost reached the eastern tip of the airfield, the troops of the LT 1/6 supported by the tanks halted.
The infantry started to dig in for the night, while the tanks fell back to a designated assembly area located near the large revetments built by the Japanese to protect their planes. This area was designated by Ed Bale on D+3 as “the location of my Company CP and maintenance area established adjacent to the airstrip”.
On Red 3, the fortified area around Burn's Philp Pier was still taking Marine lives. It was composed of many emplacements which could cover each other. Three of them were “especially formidable”, described Alexander: “a steel pillbox near the contested Burn's Philp Pier; a coconut log emplacement with multiple machine guns; and a large bombproof shelter further inland” (p.36).
On the morning of 22 November, Crowe again launched his “tired forces” against this fortified zone. At about 0930 hours, while the Marines of 2/8 were hammered by the fire coming from the entrenched enemy, a mortar round fell on the top of the coconut log emplacement and penetrated it, causing a formidable explosion.
At about the same time, Colorado pushed forward and succeeded in getting close to the steel pillbox. The tank 75mm gun fired a round directly into the opening, silencing it. Marines could now progress easily in this area.
Soon after, Colorado, supported by Marine infantry, faced the large bombproof shelter. Many rounds were fired, and Colorado quickly ran out of ammunition. The last 75mm rounds in Largey's possession were the unpopular “canister round”.
The crew of Colorado fired a lot of these rounds on the bunker, a useless effort. But, when the infantry reached the top of the bunker and threw demolition charges down the ventilators, dozens of Japanese soldiers ran out and tried to escape eastward. The Marines started to shoot at the running soldiers and one canister round fired by the tank killed at least twenty.
This sequence of the battle was filmed by combat cameraman Norman Hatch and is seen in the movie “With the Marines at Tarawa”. It is the only footage of the war in which we can see, in the same shot, the American and Japanese forces in close combat.
At about 1800 hours, Crowe’s troops halted on the same line as LT 1/6, at the eastern edge of the airstrip.
Landing Team 3/8 was positioned on the central triangle since D-Day. By D+2, they had expended their positions to the eastern corner of the triangle, where 3rd Platoon tanks were knocked out on D-Day. This allowed Colorado to recover 75mm rounds from the wrecks to continue the fight the next morning.
On the morning of D+2, Bale and Ryan linked up with the officer in charge of the freshly-landed troops of the 1/6, Bill Jones. At about 0800 hours, they started to move east to relieve the isolated infantry pocket of the LT 1/2 and 2/2.
At about noon, China Gal was joined by several light tanks that landed on Green Beach. Because Bale could not communicate with the light tanks, he gave instructions to the light tank commander, who knelt behind China Gal. Bale instructed him to “stay behind China Gal using his 37mm gun and his machine guns as he saw fit while being prepared to fire them to protect China Gal if the Japanese attempted to swarm her or place magnetic mines on her.” (Ed Bale)
Orders given by Jones were precise: tanks should operate less than 50 yards in front of the infantry and cover a 100 yard wide front along the southern shore.
As on the day before, the mission consisted of clearing fortified positions. To coordinate their effort, it was necessary for Bale to communicate with the infantry. To allow “safe” communications, Bale rotated the turret commander's hatch ring in such a way as to put an open hatch cover between the Japanese and him while talking to a courageous infantryman who climbed onto the turret.
Whenever the Japanese tried to exit a bunker, the infantry and the tanks machineguns started to shoot at them. Bale: “You watched out mostly for Japanese running out of bunkers and attempting to swarm up over the tanks and this kind of thing. Fortunately the infantry was good. Every time the Japanese tried that, the infantry would cut them down.”[1]
After three hours and about 250 Japanese soldiers killed, LT 1/6 and the tanks linked up with the exhausted Marines of the isolated position.
A halt was called and a medium tank that has been salvaged carried supplies to the troops suffering from a lack of water, salt pills and other supplies.
At the same time LT 3/6 commanded by McLeods landed on Green Beach and moved to LT 1/6's positions.
With Green Beach cleared, the Marines could now bring adequate ammunition, water and supplies to the troops on Betio. Unfortunately, it wasn’t foreseen to unload 75mm tank ammunition. However, 75mm pack howitzer ammunition was unloaded and it could be fired by the medium tanks' M 3 gun. “We fired a lot of 75mm pack howitzer ammunition, which didn’t seat properly, but it worked” remembers Ed Bale (Gilbert, p.102).
At about 1330 hours, LT 1/6 continued its progress toward the east but was quickly stopped by an enemy strong point. “The deadliest fire came from heavy weapons mounted in a turret-type emplacement” (Alexander, p.39).
It required 90 minutes of fierce fighting to neutralize this position. In this action, the light tanks' 37mm guns were useless against the heavily fortified position. Only the 75mm gun of China Gal was able to reduce the enemy opposition.
The progress slowed and during the rest of the afternoon China Gal cleared position after position, with the support of the light tanks and the infantry.
During this phase, China Gal destroyed some enemy fortifications such as bunkers and pillboxes. From one of those bunkers emerged around fifteen Japanese who started to attack the tanks with any kind of weapon.
One Japanese soldier threw a "land mine" on the rear deck of China Gal. But the explosive rolled back onto its owner, who was blown up by his own weapon in a blink of an eye.
By the end of the afternoon when they almost reached the eastern tip of the airfield, the troops of the LT 1/6 supported by the tanks halted.
The infantry started to dig in for the night, while the tanks fell back to a designated assembly area located near the large revetments built by the Japanese to protect their planes. This area was designated by Ed Bale on D+3 as “the location of my Company CP and maintenance area established adjacent to the airstrip”.
On Red 3, the fortified area around Burn's Philp Pier was still taking Marine lives. It was composed of many emplacements which could cover each other. Three of them were “especially formidable”, described Alexander: “a steel pillbox near the contested Burn's Philp Pier; a coconut log emplacement with multiple machine guns; and a large bombproof shelter further inland” (p.36).
On the morning of 22 November, Crowe again launched his “tired forces” against this fortified zone. At about 0930 hours, while the Marines of 2/8 were hammered by the fire coming from the entrenched enemy, a mortar round fell on the top of the coconut log emplacement and penetrated it, causing a formidable explosion.
At about the same time, Colorado pushed forward and succeeded in getting close to the steel pillbox. The tank 75mm gun fired a round directly into the opening, silencing it. Marines could now progress easily in this area.
Soon after, Colorado, supported by Marine infantry, faced the large bombproof shelter. Many rounds were fired, and Colorado quickly ran out of ammunition. The last 75mm rounds in Largey's possession were the unpopular “canister round”.
The crew of Colorado fired a lot of these rounds on the bunker, a useless effort. But, when the infantry reached the top of the bunker and threw demolition charges down the ventilators, dozens of Japanese soldiers ran out and tried to escape eastward. The Marines started to shoot at the running soldiers and one canister round fired by the tank killed at least twenty.
This sequence of the battle was filmed by combat cameraman Norman Hatch and is seen in the movie “With the Marines at Tarawa”. It is the only footage of the war in which we can see, in the same shot, the American and Japanese forces in close combat.
At about 1800 hours, Crowe’s troops halted on the same line as LT 1/6, at the eastern edge of the airstrip.
Landing Team 3/8 was positioned on the central triangle since D-Day. By D+2, they had expended their positions to the eastern corner of the triangle, where 3rd Platoon tanks were knocked out on D-Day. This allowed Colorado to recover 75mm rounds from the wrecks to continue the fight the next morning.
Source: Archives and Special Collections; Library of the Marine Corps.
That night, the Japanese launched several desperate counterattacks against the lines of LT 1/6. The Marines held the positions during the whole night and by the morning of D+3, 23 November, 300 dead Japanese were strewn over the ground in the Marines frontline.
It was about 0700 hours when an airstrike hammered the “tail” of the island. At the same moment, troops of LT 3/6 commanded by McLeod relieved exhausted troops of LT 1/6, commanded by Jones since they landed on Green Beach on D+1.
Bale left the assembly area where his tank spent the night to join the infantry on the frontline. He was accompanied by five light tanks and “it was like a mother hen with a bunch of chicks” remembered Bale. [1]
When they arrived on the southern shore of the island, they joined with Colorado, two other light tanks and the infantry of the 6th Marines.
The two medium tanks, the seven light tanks and the infantry formed the most powerful force on the island.
On the third day, the last assault of the battle started. All the tanks were on the same line and closely followed by the infantry. A light tank platoon leader, Warrant Officer William "Mac" McMillian remembered: “The medium tanks were not out front or behind us, they were about on the same line with us” (Gilbert p.103).
As on the previous day, the job of the infantry was to locate targets and protect the tanks. The light tanks had to protect the mediums by keeping the Japanese off of them.
While advancing, the Marines encountered only light opposition and discovered that many Japanese had committed suicide.
By 1300 hours, troops of LT 3/6 hit the eastern shore of Betio and at 1310 hours, the island was declared secure.
“It was a quiet day” for the two medium tanks remembered Bale. The tanks still had to approach the bunkers or pillboxes and fire into the openings.
No losses were recorded among either the medium or light tanks that day and McLeod declared in his report that “medium tanks were excellent. My light tanks didn’t fire a shot”.
Soon after the island was declared secured, American and British flags were raised while a bugler played. The bugler was Jimmy William, a C Company tank crewman who landed in a tank on Red Beach 1 on D-Day morning. When the ceremony was over, tanks returned to the assembly area for maintenance and reloaded ammunition.
The two tanks which were in operable condition by the afternoon of 23 November, China Gal and Colorado, were used to conduct patrols around the island during the few days the company stayed on Betio.
It was about 0700 hours when an airstrike hammered the “tail” of the island. At the same moment, troops of LT 3/6 commanded by McLeod relieved exhausted troops of LT 1/6, commanded by Jones since they landed on Green Beach on D+1.
Bale left the assembly area where his tank spent the night to join the infantry on the frontline. He was accompanied by five light tanks and “it was like a mother hen with a bunch of chicks” remembered Bale. [1]
When they arrived on the southern shore of the island, they joined with Colorado, two other light tanks and the infantry of the 6th Marines.
The two medium tanks, the seven light tanks and the infantry formed the most powerful force on the island.
On the third day, the last assault of the battle started. All the tanks were on the same line and closely followed by the infantry. A light tank platoon leader, Warrant Officer William "Mac" McMillian remembered: “The medium tanks were not out front or behind us, they were about on the same line with us” (Gilbert p.103).
As on the previous day, the job of the infantry was to locate targets and protect the tanks. The light tanks had to protect the mediums by keeping the Japanese off of them.
While advancing, the Marines encountered only light opposition and discovered that many Japanese had committed suicide.
By 1300 hours, troops of LT 3/6 hit the eastern shore of Betio and at 1310 hours, the island was declared secure.
“It was a quiet day” for the two medium tanks remembered Bale. The tanks still had to approach the bunkers or pillboxes and fire into the openings.
No losses were recorded among either the medium or light tanks that day and McLeod declared in his report that “medium tanks were excellent. My light tanks didn’t fire a shot”.
Soon after the island was declared secured, American and British flags were raised while a bugler played. The bugler was Jimmy William, a C Company tank crewman who landed in a tank on Red Beach 1 on D-Day morning. When the ceremony was over, tanks returned to the assembly area for maintenance and reloaded ammunition.
The two tanks which were in operable condition by the afternoon of 23 November, China Gal and Colorado, were used to conduct patrols around the island during the few days the company stayed on Betio.
The aftermath
It was now time for Lt. Bale to establish the list of casualties for his company.
Those Killed In Action were brought to a place which quickly became a cemetery for the Marines who had fallen during the bloody battle of Tarawa. Even though the island was declared secure, casualties were still recorded on 24 November as men died of wounds and bodies were recovered. When the Company left Tarawa, they listed twelve percent of their personnel as Killed in Action.
The last wounded were evacuated either during the fight or after the battle and treated on a ship in the lagoon. Thirty men of the C Company were reported as WIA (Wounded In Action). Among the ranks of Lt. Bale’s company, eight men were reported as Missing In Action; after the fighting ended, they were reported as assumed KIA.
Bale and his surviving men stayed on the island until 28 November and conducted extensive searches to find their MIAs. Unfortunately, their efforts were fruitless. In a later conversation with Wright (see "Who we are"), Bale stated that those missing in action troubled him a great deal.
In the final accounting, the percentage of C Company’s casualties (WIA+MIA+KIA) was about thirty two percent, significantly higher than the overall casualty rate among all the Marines that fought on Tarawa, established at nineteen percent.
Soon after the war, the men buried on Tarawa were exhumed and sent to Hawaii for re-burial on American territory.
Of the fourteen tanks of the company, half of them were lost in the water while maneuvering on the reef and five were disabled or knocked out by antitank 75mm guns.
The damaged medium tanks were inspected after the battle, to try and determine how they were put out of action and which elements could be improved.
The preliminary results of these investigations were published in the After Action Report of the 2nd Tank Battalion, dated 14 December 1943.
The following points were reported:
- The different radio frequencies, coupled with the difficulty involved in changing frequencies, made communications difficult. Moreover, the RU-GF tank radios were not compatible with infantry radios.
- Tank-infantry cooperation was nonexistent at the beginning of the battle and was the main cause of tank losses the first day.
- The 37mm guns of the light tanks were useless against Japanese fortifications. It was shown that only the 75 mm gun of the M4A2 could destroy enemy pill boxes and installations, and even then with difficulty. “In some cases the 75mm gun on the medium tank had to fire numerous rounds of AP (armor piercing) followed by HE” (high explosive). As many as forty rounds had to be used to destroy enemy positions, “for instance, the numerous times one tank was sent to the Burns-Philp pier to clean out well constructed and a well concealed positions in this area; finally the entire pier had to be shelled by a medium tank [Colorado]”.
- HE and AP munitions were effective against enemy positions. Canister rounds were useful when enemy personnel were exposed. Lack of supply of 75mm ammunition for the tanks was a great problem during the operation.
- Water depth was an important issue; even in their approach to the beach, only two M4A2 tanks were lost. It was found that the tank’s exhaust was covered with water during their approach, “causing the gas fumes to back up into the fighting compartment”.
Visibility from inside the tanks was poor and many casualties among C Company personnel were caused by inability to see shell holes or enemy guns. (This caused tanks to stumble into shell holes, from which they could not escape).
The following recommendations were made:
- To change the intercommunication system by installing suitable radios, adapted to the armored vehicles and able to change frequencies quickly and easily.
- To improve liaison between tanks and infantry. “It is imperative that more training with tanks and infantry operating together be given”.
- In addition, telephones should be added on the outside of the tanks to allow the infantry to communicate with the inside crew and designate targets.
- To equip light tanks with flamethrowers to destroy enemy pillboxes and emplacements. Infantry flamethrowers proved their ability to destroy enemy positions.
- To use only M4A2s as gun tanks, and replace the light tanks.
- To use appropriate ammunition in the tanks. For this purpose, primarily HE and AP ammunition was to be carried, and ammunition must be quickly landed on a beach behind the tanks.
- The tank’s .30 caliber machine guns should be furnished with AP ammunition.
- To improve medium tanks armor to withstand 75mm rounds from Japanese antitank guns and magnetic mines.
- To equip the medium tanks with fording kits whenever hydrographic conditions are doubtful.
The report did not recommend improving the visibility from inside the tank, but later in the war a rotating tank commander’s cupola would be equipped with six armored glass vision blocks, giving 360° vision to the tank commander.
The USS Ashland anchored in Tarawa’s lagoon on 22 November, in order to load all the medium tanks that could be recovered and carry them back to Hawaii, along with the company's surviving men.
All the tanks except two were gathered on the airstrip before being loaded back on the LSD on 27 November.
One tank remained offshore at Red 1, identified as being Bale’s tank, Cecilia, and another one from the 2nd Platoon that landed on Red 3 and that fell into an underwater shell hole.
Cecilia was never recovered and stills there today. One other was not recovered, and was reportedly used as fill material when the main pier was later reconstructed and enlarged or sold as scrap.
While still on the island, 1st Lt Ed Bale was interviewed by Technical Sergeant Samuel Shaffer, a Marine Corps correspondent of the Associated Press. In this interview Bale describes the horror of the battle and the chaos of the situation during the fight. He also described the difficulty for the crew to move their 35 tons tanks in this hostile environment.
It was now time for Lt. Bale to establish the list of casualties for his company.
Those Killed In Action were brought to a place which quickly became a cemetery for the Marines who had fallen during the bloody battle of Tarawa. Even though the island was declared secure, casualties were still recorded on 24 November as men died of wounds and bodies were recovered. When the Company left Tarawa, they listed twelve percent of their personnel as Killed in Action.
The last wounded were evacuated either during the fight or after the battle and treated on a ship in the lagoon. Thirty men of the C Company were reported as WIA (Wounded In Action). Among the ranks of Lt. Bale’s company, eight men were reported as Missing In Action; after the fighting ended, they were reported as assumed KIA.
Bale and his surviving men stayed on the island until 28 November and conducted extensive searches to find their MIAs. Unfortunately, their efforts were fruitless. In a later conversation with Wright (see "Who we are"), Bale stated that those missing in action troubled him a great deal.
In the final accounting, the percentage of C Company’s casualties (WIA+MIA+KIA) was about thirty two percent, significantly higher than the overall casualty rate among all the Marines that fought on Tarawa, established at nineteen percent.
Soon after the war, the men buried on Tarawa were exhumed and sent to Hawaii for re-burial on American territory.
Of the fourteen tanks of the company, half of them were lost in the water while maneuvering on the reef and five were disabled or knocked out by antitank 75mm guns.
The damaged medium tanks were inspected after the battle, to try and determine how they were put out of action and which elements could be improved.
The preliminary results of these investigations were published in the After Action Report of the 2nd Tank Battalion, dated 14 December 1943.
The following points were reported:
- The different radio frequencies, coupled with the difficulty involved in changing frequencies, made communications difficult. Moreover, the RU-GF tank radios were not compatible with infantry radios.
- Tank-infantry cooperation was nonexistent at the beginning of the battle and was the main cause of tank losses the first day.
- The 37mm guns of the light tanks were useless against Japanese fortifications. It was shown that only the 75 mm gun of the M4A2 could destroy enemy pill boxes and installations, and even then with difficulty. “In some cases the 75mm gun on the medium tank had to fire numerous rounds of AP (armor piercing) followed by HE” (high explosive). As many as forty rounds had to be used to destroy enemy positions, “for instance, the numerous times one tank was sent to the Burns-Philp pier to clean out well constructed and a well concealed positions in this area; finally the entire pier had to be shelled by a medium tank [Colorado]”.
- HE and AP munitions were effective against enemy positions. Canister rounds were useful when enemy personnel were exposed. Lack of supply of 75mm ammunition for the tanks was a great problem during the operation.
- Water depth was an important issue; even in their approach to the beach, only two M4A2 tanks were lost. It was found that the tank’s exhaust was covered with water during their approach, “causing the gas fumes to back up into the fighting compartment”.
Visibility from inside the tanks was poor and many casualties among C Company personnel were caused by inability to see shell holes or enemy guns. (This caused tanks to stumble into shell holes, from which they could not escape).
The following recommendations were made:
- To change the intercommunication system by installing suitable radios, adapted to the armored vehicles and able to change frequencies quickly and easily.
- To improve liaison between tanks and infantry. “It is imperative that more training with tanks and infantry operating together be given”.
- In addition, telephones should be added on the outside of the tanks to allow the infantry to communicate with the inside crew and designate targets.
- To equip light tanks with flamethrowers to destroy enemy pillboxes and emplacements. Infantry flamethrowers proved their ability to destroy enemy positions.
- To use only M4A2s as gun tanks, and replace the light tanks.
- To use appropriate ammunition in the tanks. For this purpose, primarily HE and AP ammunition was to be carried, and ammunition must be quickly landed on a beach behind the tanks.
- The tank’s .30 caliber machine guns should be furnished with AP ammunition.
- To improve medium tanks armor to withstand 75mm rounds from Japanese antitank guns and magnetic mines.
- To equip the medium tanks with fording kits whenever hydrographic conditions are doubtful.
The report did not recommend improving the visibility from inside the tank, but later in the war a rotating tank commander’s cupola would be equipped with six armored glass vision blocks, giving 360° vision to the tank commander.
The USS Ashland anchored in Tarawa’s lagoon on 22 November, in order to load all the medium tanks that could be recovered and carry them back to Hawaii, along with the company's surviving men.
All the tanks except two were gathered on the airstrip before being loaded back on the LSD on 27 November.
One tank remained offshore at Red 1, identified as being Bale’s tank, Cecilia, and another one from the 2nd Platoon that landed on Red 3 and that fell into an underwater shell hole.
Cecilia was never recovered and stills there today. One other was not recovered, and was reportedly used as fill material when the main pier was later reconstructed and enlarged or sold as scrap.
While still on the island, 1st Lt Ed Bale was interviewed by Technical Sergeant Samuel Shaffer, a Marine Corps correspondent of the Associated Press. In this interview Bale describes the horror of the battle and the chaos of the situation during the fight. He also described the difficulty for the crew to move their 35 tons tanks in this hostile environment.
The article was relayed by many daily newspapers and published on Tuesday December 28th 1943.
CBS created a radio program based on this article in 1944; described as "a bunch of crap" by Ed Bale.
Thanks to the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel for allowing us to publish this article.
The USS Ashland left Tarawa 28 November and arrived in Hawaii the 30th. There, the men rested and trained on the main island, Hilo, at the Parker Ranch. The twelve tanks were offloaded at Maui for repairs. Because most of them fell into underwater shell holes which shorted out the electrical system, it was easy to repair them. Most of those tanks were re-used by the Tank Company, 22nd Marines in the Marshall Islands campaign.
In February, after training with the 2nd Tank Battalion, Charlie Company was transferred to become A Company, 2nd Tank Battalion. The original A Company, 112 men and four officers, was attached to them.
The battalion was equipped with new M4A2 tanks and Able Company took part in Saïpan operation from 15 June to 8 July 1944, closely followed by the Tinian operation. Bale’s company was the only company from 2nd Tank Battalion to see action on Okinawa, when the reserve regiment from the 2nd marine Division was committed late in the battle.
When the Japanese surrendered on 14 August 1945, American units designated as occupation forces for the Japan mainland included the 2nd Tank Battalion. The battalion was assigned to Nagasaki.
[1] Interview with the National Museum of the Pacific War, Fredericksburg, Texas.
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